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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 













Civil Action File No. 
2014CV240975 .' Or.:FiCE FiLED IN J;- 
Bus 2 
JAN 0 S 2015 
v. 
BRIAN KEEN and HEALTH 
COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES, LLC, 
Defendants. 
DEPUTY CLERi( S\Jr':'::F~IO~ COU 
FI.j1 .. TC't·j CO:.JN I Y. (;_,/\_~~ 1...- ---- 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On January 5,2015, the parties appeared before the Court to present oral argument on the 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Upon consideration of the parties' oral arguments, 
briefs, and the record in this case, the Court finds as follows: 
In early 2012, Plaintiff Jay Ordan ("Ordan") and Defendant Brian Keen ("Keen"), the 
sole owner of Health Cooperative Strategies, LLC, ("HCS"), entered into discussions regarding 
the business ofHCS. HCS helps certain industry associations form and manage health benefit 
plans for their members under Georgia's Multiple Employer Welfare Association regulations. 
HCS sought investors and Ordan, as a broker of health care products, had industry connections. 
In March of2012, Ordan introduced Keen to Steve Needle, an agent of the McCart Group. The 
McCart Group eventually invested in HCS. Ordan was paid a finder's fee for this introduction. 
Ordan claims that in late June, or early July, 2012, he and Keen verbally agreed that he 
would receive a 25% equity stake in HCS in exchange for his continuing marketing, sales, and 
general business services. Keen admits that they discussed Ordan becoming an owner ofHCS, 
but maintains that the two men never agreed to the terms, and argues that even if there was an 
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agreement to the terms, as Ordan suggests, that Ordan did not uphold his purported end of the 
agreement. Keen's failure to give Ordan a 25% equity interest is at the heart of his claims. I 
In support of their positions, the parties cite to several documents created in the 
following months leading up to March 2013 when Ordan discovered that Keen did not consider 
him a 25% owner. First, Keen emailed Ordan discussing compensation on July 2,2012, "per our 
conversation." The email discussed a commission structure, but did not mention a 25% 
ownership interest. 
Next, during July and August 2012, HCS and the McCart Group negotiated a 
Memorandum of Understanding that defined the relationship of the companies and finalized the 
McCart Group's investment. The final executed Memorandum of Understanding dated August 
29,2012, states, "Jay Ordan will contribute sales oversight, support and creative direction to 
HCS and the services of Ken Southerland as the COO of this enterprise as part of his 
contribution." Ordan testified that he acted on behalf ofHCS seeking investors, handling 
marketing and advertising, and as a partner consulting on all business matters. He contends he 
performed this work for HCS relying on Keen's promise of25% equity. Southerland also began 
performing duties on behalf of HCS. Ordan testified that Ken Southerland initially had a limited 
role in HCS. He was tasked with getting the company records in working order, which, Ordan 
claims, included putting together the operating agreement. In exchange for Southerland's 
services, Ordan states he promised Southerland a 5% ownership interest in HCS out of his 25% 
interest. 
I The counts are as follows: Count 1 - Declaratory Judgment; Count 2 - Breach of Contract; Count 3 - Quantum 
Meruit (In the alternate to Breach of Contract); Count 4 - Fraud; Count 5 - Breach of Duty to Allow Access to 
Company Records in Violation ofO.e.G.A. § 14-11-313; Count 6 -Punitive Damages; Count 8 - Attorney's Fees 
and Costs of Litigation. Count 7 for failure to pay minimum wage was voluntarily dismissed. 
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Finally, from September 21,2012 to October 31,2012, multiple drafts of an operating 
agreement were created by an attorney procured by Southerland. The drafts list Keith Ordan, 
Ordan's son and intended beneficiary, as having an equity interest in HCS varying from 20% to 
26.7%. They also show Ken Southerland holding a 5% ownership stake in HCS. The operating 
agreements were never executed, and the parties dispute the extent of Keen's knowledge of these 
drafts. 
In performing the work for HCS, Ordan maintained office space with other HCS 
executives in the McCart Group offices. The internal phone directory assigned an HCS 
designation to Ordan similar to the other HCS principals. Third parties have also provided 
affidavits that Keen and another equity investor referred to Ordan as an equity partner. 
Defendants move for summary judgment on all counts. A court should grant a motion for 
summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 when the moving party shows that no 
genuine issue of material fact remains to be tried and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the 
light most favorable to the non-movant, warrant summary judgment as a matter oflaw. Lau's 
Corp., Inc. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 491 (1991). "On summary judgment, after the movant 
makes a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter oflaw, the burden then 
shifts to the respondent to come forward with rebuttal evidence." L.D.F. Family Farm, Inc. v. 
Charterbank, 326 Ga. App. 361, 362 (2014) (citations omitted). 
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs Counsel, at oral argument, advised the Court that Ordan 
would not be pursuing his claim for declaratory judgment because he no longer considers himself 
a member ofHCS. Accordingly, Count 1 for Declaratory Judgment is hereby DISMISSED 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
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Additionally, since Ordan is not a current member ofHCS, he does not have standing to 
seek relief under O.e.G.A. § 14-11-313. Therefore, summary judgment as to Count 5, Breach of 
Duty to Allow Access to Company Records, is hereby GRANTED. 
I. Breach of Contract 
Defendants argue that no oral contract was formed because there is no evidence of mutual 
assent to the terms, the terms were too indefinite to be enforced, and there was a failure of 
consideration. However, each of these arguments fail because the evidence indicates there is a 
dispute of fact as to the formation of an oral contract. 
"Georgia law recognizes that an oral contract falling outside the purview of the Statute of 
Frauds may be binding and enforceable." Turner Broad. Sys. v. McDavid, 303 Ga. App. 593,596 
(2010). "To constitute a valid contract, there must be parties able to contract, a consideration 
moving to the contract, the assent of the parties to the terms of the contract, and a subject matter 
upon which the contract can operate." O.C.G.A. § 13-3-1. 
In determining whether there was a mutual assent, courts apply an objective 
theory of intent whereby one party's intention is deemed to be that meaning 
a reasonable man in the position of the other contracting party would 
ascribe to the first party's manifestation or assent, or that meaning which 
the other contracting party knew the first party ascribed to his manifestation 
of assent. Further, in cases such as this one, the circumstances surrounding 
the making of the contract, such as correspondence and discussions, are 
relevant in deciding if there was a mutual assent to an agreement. Where 
such extrinsic evidence exists and is disputed, the question of whether a 
party has assented to the contract is generally a matter for the jury. 
Turner Broad. Sys., 303 Ga. App at 597. "Where there is a conflict in evidence as to the 
existence of an oral contract or as to its terms, the matter must be submitted to a jury for 
resolution." Fay v. Custom One Homes, LLC, 276 Ga. App. 188, 190 (2005). 
Here, Ordan has presented sufficient evidence of mutual assent to create a genuine issue 
of material fact to be decided by a jury. Although the July 2 email did not mention a 25% equity 
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interest, Ordan has testified that Keen orally promised him a 25% ownership interest in HCS in 
exchange for his continuing management role. Although Keen disputes any agreement was 
reached, he does admit that they discussed Ordan becoming an owner. Additionally, Ordan has 
presented affidavits of third parties who claim that Keen held Ordan out as an equity partner. 
Therefore, the evidence of record shows that the circumstances surrounding the making of this 
contract could support a determination by the jury that mutual assent existed. 
Further, although Defendants' contend the terms are too indefinite for a contract to have 
formed, "the law does not favor the destruction of contracts on grounds of uncertainty." Kitchen 
v. Insuaramerica Corp., 296 Ga. App. 739, 743 (2009). "[A]n indefinite contract. .. may acquire 
more precision and become enforceable because of the subsequent words or actions of the 
parties." Id. at 602-03. Here there is evidence suggesting that Keen and HCS held Ordan out as 
an equity owner to third parties, that Ordan was provided HCS office space and an HCS phone 
extension, and that Ordan provided his own services to HCS as well as the services of 
Southerland as outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding between McCart and Keen. On 
the other hand, the size of Ordan's equity interest is unclear-25%, 20%, or somewhere between 
20% and 26.7%. A jury issue remains as to the terms of any oral contract between the parties. 
Finally, Defendants' contend there is a failure of consideration for two reasons. First, 
Defendants argue that at the time of the alleged oral agreement, Ordan did not make a return 
promise and the finder's fee was his compensation for work already performed. Second, 
Defendants argue that ifOrdan did give a return promise, it was to provide the services of Ken 
Southerland, and Defendants' state Ordan never compensated Southerland. However,Ordan 
presents evidence of additional work for HCS beyond finding McCart as an investor for which 
he admits he received a finder's fee. It is this work he claims was performed in exchange for a 
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25% equity interest. Additionally, Ordan contends the compensation agreed to by Ken 
Southerland was, in part, 20% of his 25% equity. 
The facts asserted by both parties as to the formation of an oral contract are contested 
and therefore, summary judgment as to Count 2 for Breach of Contract is hereby DENIED. 
II. Quantum Meruit 
Defendants next argue that Ordan's quantum meruit claim cannot survive summary 
judgment for the same reasons they argue consideration is not present; Ordan was paid a finder's 
fee and he never paid for Ken Southerland's services. However, Ordan contends he provided 
more to HCS than the introduction of the McCart Group and states he would be compensating 
Southerland by giving him a 5% equity interest in HCS. 
"A claim of unjust enrichment will lie if there is no legal contract and 'the party sought to 
be charged has been conferred a benefit by the party contending an unjust enrichment which the 
benefitted party equitably ought to return or compensate for. '" Jones v. White, 311 Ga. App. 822, 
827 (2011) (quoting Smith v. McClung, 215 Ga. App. 786, 789(3) (1994)). The evidence of 
record shows there are disputes of fact as to the formation of a contract and the services provided 
by Ordan. A jury could find that no contract was formed, but that Ordan performed valuable 
services for HCS for which he should be compensated for under a quantum meruit theory. 
Therefore, summary judgment as to Count 3 for Quantum Meruit is hereby DENIED. 
III. Fraud, Punitive Damages, and Attorney's Fees. 
Defendants next argue that Ordan's fraud claim fails because he has not established a 
false representation by Keen, Keen's intention to induce Ordan's reliance, or Ordan's justifiable 
reliance. "To survive a motion for summary judgment in an action for fraud ... , a plaintiff must 
come forward with some evidence from which a jury could find each of the following elements, 
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false representation; scienter; intent to induce the party claiming fraud to act or refrain from 
acting; justifiable reliance; and damage proximately caused by the representation." Jar Allah. v 
Schoen et al., 243 Ga. App. 402,403-04 (2000). 
Here, Ordan contends that he was promised 25% equity and he relied on this promise by 
continuing to work for HCS. As previously discussed, the evidence could support a finding that 
Keen promised Ordan equity. However, a disputed promise alone with no evidence of scienter 
or present intent not to perform the promise is insufficient to create a fraud claim. "[T]he general 
rule is that actionable fraud cannot be predicated upon promises to perform some act in the 
future." J Kinson Cook of Ga. , Inc. v. HeerylMitchell, 284 Ga App. 552,558 (2007) (quoting 
Hamilton v. Advance Leasing, etc., 208 Ga App. 848, 850(2) (1993)) (affirming grant of 
summary judgment on fraud claim). "Nor does actionable fraud result from a mere failure to 
perform promises made. Otherwise any breach of a contract would amount to fraud." Id. The 
exception to the general rule is "where a promise as to future events is made with a present intent 
not to perform." Id. at 559 (finding that vague, equivocal, self-serving, conclusory evidence is 
insufficient evidence of present intent not to perform); see also Pacrim Assoc. v. Turner Home 
Entertainment, Inc., 235 Ga App 761, 767 (1998) (affirming summary judgment on fraud claim 
because plaintiff did not present any evidence of defendant's intent not to comply with promise 
at the time when the promise was made to make plaintiff exclusive licensing agent). Here, there 
is no evidence that Keen made promises to Ordan with a present intent not to fulfill them. 
Therefore, summary judgment as to Count 4 for Fraud is hereby GRANTED. 
Since the fraud claim cannot stand, summary judgment as to Count 6 for Punitive 
Damages is hereby GRANTED. 
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Further, since recovery is still possible on multiple claims, summary judgment as to 
Count 8 for Attorney's Fees and Costs is hereby DENIED. 
So ORDERED this ??Mday of January, 2015. 
BETH E. LONG, E lOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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Co.pies to.: 
AttorneY's for Jay Ordan :. AttOl1ney for Deftndants ~. 
- " - 
John M. Gross 
Todd J. Poole AmyK. Weber 
Jon David W. Huffman TAYLOR ENGLISH DUMA LLP 
POOLE LAW GROUP 1600 Parkwood Circle, Suite 400 
315 W. Ponce de Leon Ave. Atlanta, Georgia 30339 
Suite 225 (770) 434-6868 
Decatur, GA 30030 j gross@taylorenglish.com 
(404) 373-4008 aweber@taylorenglish.col11 
todd@QoolelawgrouQ.com 
j ondavid@QoolelawgrouQ.com 
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